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The main purpose of this paper is to study whether corporate governance 
aspects like board size, audit committee and board composition affect the 
return on equity (performance) of companies listed on Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. The data were gathered by purposive sampling techniques from 
the Balance Sheet Analysis report available on the State Bank of Pakistan 
website and relevant companies’ websites. A regression model was 
incorporated to measure the available data for a sample of 50 firms, with a 
total of 150 years of observations for a period of 2013 -2015. The 
empirical results indicate that board size, audit committee and board 
composition are positively associated to return on equity. The result of 
this study suggests that each organization needs to develop good corporate 
practices to significantly improve the shareholder wealth in the form of 
return on equity.  The selected sample is taken from non-financial firms 
with a small sample size, therefore, in future for more generalizability of 
the results a study may be undertaken to consider financial and non- 
financial firms with a large sample size. 
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Corporate governance is usually a structure through which firms are run and regulated (Ahmed Sheikh, 
Wang, & Khan, 2013; Ehikioya, 2009). The growth of corporate governance has been motivated by the 
need to gain both the stockholders and stakeholders confidence on capital markets and financial system. 
Efficient governance mechanisms can effectively extend companies ' ability to make prompt business 





decisions and improve business performance. Cadbury (1992) suggests that corporate governance is the 
performance of all activities and operations carried out within the organization to improve the financial 
position and the interests of shareholders. Similarly, the World Bank has elaborated corporate governance 
as rules and regulations, customs and policies that are prejudicial to and administered by companies. After 
the bankruptcy of two gigantic businesses Enron and WorldCom, the corporate governance scheme 
gained significance. Investors were discouraged from investing in any company, thereby restoring 
investor confidence and enhancing the corporate governance system and hence the Sarbon  Oxlay Act 
(2000) was introduced.  
 
Good corporate governance focuses on an openness, justice and accountability in the company 
management (Ehikioya, 2009). It protects the interests of shareholders and also helps to ensure the return 
of local and foreign investors. The Pakistan Security and Exchange Commission introduced the corporate 
governance code in early 2000, which was the first step towards its reforms. These codes include 
recommendations for improving businesses, such as boards of directors will be responsible to 
shareholders, the firm will be obliged to reveal real data to the general public, so all of these reforms will 
improve inner and external audit, board size and board composition. This aims to ensure the distinction of 
ownership and control, which often leads to principal-agent problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory explains disagreements between owners and Board of Directors. The ownership and 
control among principal and agents has been one of the most contentious issues in financial literature 
(Ehikioya, 2009). 
 
According to Ahmed Sheikh et al. (2013), analytical work into corporate governance and firm 
performance frameworks was largely grounded on data from advanced countries with many structural 
parallels. Empirical evidence does, though, show conflicting and contradictory findings. On the other side, 
little is documented empirically about firms with specific institutional structures in developing countries, 
Therefore, limited research on corporations in developing countries and equivocal findings are a number 
of reasons that more research need to be conducted on the connection of corporate governance and return 
on equity (Ahmed Sheikh et al., 2013). In Pakistan many studies are conducted on the said relationship in 
different organization with different parameters but In spite of attempts to establish new theoretical 
perspectives and to investigate behavioral variables in corporate governance, study is still required to 
explore such problems in various institutional environments (Westphal & Zajac, 2013).Therefore, this 
research is an effort to fill the gap by contributing to the literature through investigating empirically the 
association of corporate governance and return on equity ( firm’s performance). This research will also 
provide a new evidence that how corporate governance influences return on equity, which will assist 
academics and corporate sector in decision making regarding corporate governances and performance. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance  
From the point of view of agency theory , the goal of corporate governance is to ensure managers use 
techniques to optimize the worth of the organization and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Sheikh 
(2002) describes corporate governance as a structure whereby managers are empowered and responsible 
for managing their businesses. It is the way for corporate actions, agents and assets to achieve the 
corporate goal set by the shareholder of the corporation (Sternberg, 2004). In other words corporate 
governance is  the system of legislation, regulations,  forces controlling the company's activities and 
monitor organizational goals and results (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Gillan & Starks, 1998). In 
consequence, corporate governance distributes the rights and duties among different corporate members 
like board members, management, shareholders and other stakeholders, and it ensures that choices on 
corporate matters are clearly defined in laws and processes (Turlea, Mocanu, & Carmen, 2010).The 
practice of corporate governance is seen as an internal management monitoring mechanism. Good 
governance is an effective instrument that helps a company to achieve better performance (Chen & 
Rezaee, 2012). 






Corporate governance can be seen from the viewpoint of both the shareholders and the organization. From 
shareholders point of view corporate governance is usually related to maximizing shareholders wealth, 
while from organizational point of view, it is mostly concerned with monitoring and maintaining business 
operations mechanisms (Bruno & Claessens, 2007; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2003; Zingales, 1997). In 
practical terms, corporate governance includes the corporation's responsibility to its shareholders and 
stakeholders. Corporate governance is a mechanism for framing and seeking to resolve the corporate 
stakeholders ' agency problems, including shareholders and creditors (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Hakim Sam, 
2002). Even the aim of corporate governance is different from business to firm or country to country, but 
the main objective is to promote a good code of mechanisms to develop and regulate the organization 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Hence, a good governance system helps to ensure that the management uses 
business resources properly for the best interests of the shareholders and reports reasonably the financial 
situation and performance of the business (Lin, Huang, & Chuang, 2018) 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
A good corporate governance system plays an essential role to increase firm performance, because it 
keeps close eye on every activity of managers, executives and administration which will reduce the 
fraudulent activities because of strong Audit Committee and will ultimately increase the firm performance 
(Bansal & Sharma, 2016; Rasheed & Nisar, 2018). In addition, it produces a transparent and accountable 
atmosphere in which all activities and people are accountable to their Manager (Wong, 2016). Thus, a 
good corporate governance scheme generates an atmosphere in which managers and executives do their 
work with complete efforts that are very useful to the businesses themselves and also boost investors ' 
firm value and confidence (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; Narayanaswamy, Raghunandan, & Rama, 
2012). 
 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) investigate that firms with bad governance invest surplus 
money reserves in low-revenue investments and if the company is well governed, this adverse effect of 
surplus money expenditure on working results will be revoked. Further, their study results directly 
demonstrate how governance can increase corporate efficiency and understand the significance of 
governance in determining corporate policies. One of the most significant duties of directors is to 
supervise managers to guarantee that the interests of shareholders are protected. This connection is 
formalized between shareholders and their agents by Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).According to Agency Theory, Board of Directors work on behalf of owners of the organization, and 
take decision to increase their wealth. For improving the performance of a firm the organization must 
have proper board of directors with the required members and proper audit system to monitor agency 
function of an organization.  
 
Adopting best corporate governance practices, like an improved audit committee, enhances management 
oversight and eliminates issues with information asymmetry (Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, & 
Nagel, 2012). High level of audit committees enhances the firm performance  and is linked with improved 
monitoring of overall financial reporting process (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015; Klein, 2003). The convention 
on corporate governance adopted from advance market codes and guidelines to meet the Board's role 
requires the cooperation of both executive and non-executive directors (Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh, & 
Rudkin, 2010). Boards lacking non-Executive Director were considered with a significant de jure power 
but little de facto power, controlled by the Chief Executive Officer and prone to desires clashes with 
principals (Weidenbaum, 1986). 
 
Further, the association between corporate governance and performance has been examined in many 
studies in different countries with contradictory and inconsistence results (Arora & Sharma, 2016; Sanjai 
Bhagat & Bolton, 2008, 2019; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Buallay, Hamdan, & Zureigat, 2017; Detthamrong, 
Chancharat, & Vithessonthi, 2017; Muhammad, Rehman, & Waqas, 2016). Similarly, Guest (2009) found 





no proof that organizational features that decide the board size in the UK lead to a better results 
connection for the board size.  The negative association was found between board size and firm 
performance (Arora & Sharma, 2016; Dwivedi & Jain, 2005; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008) and contrary a 
positive association in  board size and firm performance was determined (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Mak & 
Kusnadi, 2005), whereas, in Malaysian firms Anum Mohd Ghazali (2010) found no significant 
association between board size and performance. 
 
2.3 Board Size 
Board size refers to numbers of directors employed in an organization for the well-being of shareholders. 
The Board of Directors shall function as possessor of the company which shall take action and take 
decisions concerning the best interests of the shareholders. Fama (1980) argued that directors split 
authorities and tasks between employee for the best curiosity of shareholders and company. The board 
therefore operates on behalf of the owners and therefore the board size plays a significant part in 
improving company efficiency. 
 
2.4 Audit Committee 
The Sarbon Oxley Act (2000), make it compulsory for all businesses to maintain one professional audit 
committee managers who have the financial, audit and management understanding and autonomy of all 
other employees. According to the report of the blue ribbon committee (1999) the Audit Committee 
shows an central role in monitoring all business transactions, the audit process, the utilization and  use of 
funds, when and where and from where funds are obtained, All these actions will therefore bring 
transparency and prevent fraudulent practices that will eventually boost the return on equity. 
 
2.5 Board Composition 
The Board Composition implies the proportion of executive and non-executive directors operating an 
organisation to shareholders ' best interests. Dare (1998) asserts that non-executive directors have an 
important role to play to resolve all issue and monitors all the strategy of the company which will result 
higher firm performance. Moreover they feel free to make judgment while dealing with executive 
directors regarding appointing and dismissal of executive directors. O'Sullivan and Wong (1999) says that 
non-executive directors decrease their effect if they worked in the same board for long time. Similarly, 
Klein (2003) affirms that there is an insignificant relationship between the proportion of external 
managers and firm performance, but Fosberg (1989) performed a survey and discovered no relationship in 
the percentage of external managers and company performance measures. The connection between 
company performance and the percentage of external managers has therefore blended outcomes. The 
relationship between external directors' proportion and firm performance is mixed (Yasser, Entebang, & 
Mansor, 2011). The organizational performance is insignificantly correlated to a higher proportion of 
outsiders on the executive board (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). While on the other hand S Bhagat and Black 
(2002) established no significant link between board composition and firm performance. In Pakistan, the 
Corporate Governance Code limited all registered companies that the fraction of executive directors 
should not surpass 75% of the complete size of the board, as well as encouraging and cheering the 
representation of minority shareholders and autonomous directors.   
 
2.6 Hypothesis 
One of the most significant duties of directors is to supervise managers to guarantee that the interests of 
shareholders are protected. This connection is formalized between shareholders and their agents by 
Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).According to Agency Theory, Board of Directors work on 
behalf of owners of the organization, and take decision to increase their worth. For improving the 
performance of a firm the organization must have proper board composition with the required board size 
and proper audit system to monitor agency function within organization. Therefore, on the basis of this 
we hypothesize that: 






H1: “A significant association exists between corporate governor facets (Board Size, Audit Committee 
and Board Composition) and Return on Equity (Performance) 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The population of this research was the entire non-financial firms registered with PSX from 2013 to 2015. 
A purposive sampling technique was used and only 50 firms were randomly selected whose data were 
available to perform the statistical analysis. The data was congregated from Balance Sheet Analysis 
available at State Bank of Pakistan Website. The data was analysed by the following statistical model. 
 
Y= α +βƑit+εi …………. (1) 
 
Where, Y= Independent Variable, α = Constant, β = Coefficient of variable (Corporate Governance Facet 
i.e. Board Size, Audit Committee and Board Composition”), Ƒit = explanatory variable and εi = error 
term. 
 
Return on Equity was used as a representative of Firm Performance for a time space of 2013 to 2015. 
More specifically, by adopting econometric model mentioned in equation (1), equation (2) evolve, which 
is as under 
 
Firm Performance = βα+ β1BSIZ+ β2AUDCOM + β3BCOMP …………. (2) 
 
3.1  Measurement of Variables 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the measure that is the best financial performance predictor. 
However, each measure has its own strengths and weaknesses, so there is no metric to be the best 
representative for financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Marashdeh, 2014). Many studies 
analyze the firm performance using a number of financial indicators such as Tobin’s Q (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003), Return on Assets (Rashid & Lodh, 2008) and Return on Equity (Adjaoud, Zeghal, & 
Andaleeb, 2007). In this research, the firm’s performance is measured through Return on Equity. 
According to Ping, Chang-qing, and Li (2011) Return on Equity measure is the best indicator of firm’s 
performance. It not only shows the profitability of equity capital and its accumulation as an significant 
economic indicator, but also captures the greatest attention of investors 
 





3.1.2 Independent Variable 
The important determinants of CG are taken to measure the overall Corporate Governance.  These are: 
Board Size:      BSIZ = Total number of Directors 
Audit Committee Size:  AUDCOM = Total number of directors in the audit committee 
Board Composition: BCOMP = Proportion of managers and non-managers sitting on the board 
 
3.2 Analysis 
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In the given Table 1 the normal board size of the firms is 9, and the percentage of external director (Board 
Composition) is about 7. Audit committee has the largest value (91) which means that 91% of the 
companies have audit committee members collected on non-executive directors. According to the code of 
corporate governance (2002) of Pakistan it’s mandatory for every firm to have at least 3 “audit 
committee” members comprising of non-executive boards having knowledge of accounting and auditing 
discipline.  





Table 1:  Descriptive Analysis 
 
 ROE BSIZE AUDCOM BCOMP” 
Mean 0.24 9.4 0.91 7.5 
Median 0.2 9 1 7 
Std.Dev 0.17 2.50 0.26 3.8 
Minimum -0.05 6 0 0.25 
Maximum 67.5 15 1 15 
N.Valid 150 150 150 150 
 
3.2.2 Regression Analysis 
The correlation between all of the study variables is shown in Table 2 below. The results of the Pearson 
Correlation assessment indicate that ROE correlates positively and significantly with the board size. 
Likewise, the audit committee and the members of the board also have the same results.  
 
Table 2: Correlations 
 
  ROE BSIZE AUDCOM BCOMP 
ROE 1    
BSIZE 0.23 1   
AUDCOM 0.16 0.29 1  
BCOMP 0.14 0.59 0.55 1 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 150 150 150 150 
 
The result of ANOVA shown in Table 3 depicts that the F- values of ROE which is used as a proxy for 
performance measure is F= 0.941 (p=0.000), which shows that a robust relation exist between ROE  and 
corporate governance (Three corporate governance facets i.e. Board Size, Audit Committee and Board 
Composition)  
 
Table 3: ANOVA 
 
Model Sum of Square Df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Group 0.12 4 0.029   
Within Group 1.68 55 0.04 0.941 0 
Total 1.79 59    
 
The estimates of the coefficient are presented in Table 4. The board size ratio is 0.0219, indicating a 
favorable connection between board size and ROE, and the statistical significance level is 5% and 10%. 
As a consequence, the connection between the Audit Committee, the Board of Directors and the ROE is 
positive and substantial at a rate of 5%. Statistically, the average size of the board is about 9, which is 
very low in the context of Pakistan. This statistical outcome is therefore comparable to the outcomes of 
prior scientists (Sanda et al., 2005; Bokpin et al., 2006).There is also a beneficial and important 
connection between board structure and ROE. It means that firm financial performance and outside 
directors of the board have strong association with each other. The same result is also investigated by 
Bhagat and Black (2002) and Sanda et al. (2005)”.The outcome also demonstrates that there exist positive 











Table 4: Regression Analysis 
 





Adjusted R2 -0.0042 
F Statistics 0.9384 
Sig. 0.000 
No of Observations 150 
 
4. Discussion and Findings 
In this research study, researcher has used three “Corporate Governance Facets (Board Size, Audit 
Committee and Board Composition) as independent variables and ROE” as dependent construct used as 
proxy of financial performance measure. A sample size for this study is 50 firm enlisted in PSX for the 
time period of 2013 to 2015. 
 
The findings of the study are as following 
• ROE and Board size have  significant positive association with each other”  
• Positive and significant association was found between audit committee  and   ROE(Firm 
performance)” 
• ROE and Board Composition are also positively and significantly interlinked to one another”. 
• Based on these statistical results and findings we accepted the assumption "Corporate Governance 
Facet (Board Size, Audit Committee and Board Composition) and Firm Performance (ROE) have 
an important connection. 
 
5. Recommendations and Limitations 
For future research, it is recommended that researchers should increase numbers of firms, time period and 
also include maximum variables of corporate Governance facets for robustness of result. This research 
has certain constraints. The first limitation is selection of small sample size. The second limitation is short 
span of time. Third limitation is consideration of very few facets of corporate governance facets. The 
fourth and final limitation is that the selected companies are taken from non-financial sectors which are 
enlisted in Pakistan Stock Exchange. The area for additional and future researchers is in-depth 
examination of all financial and non-financial sectors of Pakistan which are enlisted in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSX) and inclusion of some moderating and mediating variables.    
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